Iranian-Israeli relations in light of the Iranian Revolution by Vessali, Behrang Vameghi
 
The Thesis committee for Behrang Vameghi Vessali 





Iranian-Israeli Relations  
 














                              ________________________________________ 
                          Kamran Aghaie 
       
                              
               __________________________________________ 









      
                    Iranian-Israeli Relations  
 







Behrang Vameghi Vessali, B.A. 
 
 
                                                          Thesis 
 
 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of the University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
 
 
Master of Arts 




Iranian-Israeli Relations  
 




Behrang Vameghi Vessali, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2010 
 
Supervisor: Kamran Aghaie 
 
 
 Prior to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran and Israel were 
allies who cooperated extensively with one another to promote Western 
secular Capitalist values in the Middle East while countering Soviet 
influence and the proliferation of Communism in the greater Middle East. 
The connection between Israel and Iran ran deeper than geopolitics; it 
reached back into the depths of Jewish and Persian history. But the 
overthrow of the pro-Western Iranian king, Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, and Ayatollah Khomeini‟s rise to power led to a sudden, dramatic 
reversal of the Iran‟s decades-long policy of full cooperation and 
accommodation of Western interests. Subsequently, Israeli ties were 
officially severed and the Islamic Republic designated Israel and Zionism 
as the greatest threat to Iran and the whole of the Islamic world.  
After the hostage crisis and the ensuing severance of relations with 
the United States, a politically unstable Iran was invaded by Iraq. In spite 
of the constant stream of public denunciations and threats of annihilation, 
Israel covertly supplied Iran with American made weapons and parts, 
without which Iran would likely have quickly lost the war. Ultimately, 
geopolitical and economic concerns trumped any ideological clashes 
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and potential threat emanating from the Ayatollahs in Tehran. Throughout 
the 1980‟s, and specifically during the Iran-Iraq War, Israel refrained from 
reciprocating the hostile rhetoric emanating from Khomeini and his 
extremist government.  
Following the revolution and Iran‟s embrace of an extremist 
interpretation of Islamic resistance to the West, Iran and Israel came to be 
seen as ideological and political polar opposites. The animosity between 
the two former allies was presented as a clash of civilizations: a secular, 
Western democracy against a backwards, theological authoritarian 
regime. Yet in reality there were striking similarities in geopolitical strategy, 
national and religious ideology, and domestic social psychology. This 
thesis will consider the Iranian and Israeli narratives and compare the 
religious, historical, ideological and psycho-political underpinnings that 
reveal significant similarities between these two superficially diametrically 
opposed states, and ultimately shaped the complex and misunderstood 
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Contemporary Iran and Israel comprise the two most ostentatiously 
antagonistic nations in the world. Media outlets regularly highlight Iranian 
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad‟s calls for the destruction of Israel, 
which he bitingly refers to as the “Zionist Entity”. His denunciations echo 
those of his ideological progenitor Ayatollah Khomeini, and represent the 
Islamic Republic‟s official stance: absolute condemnation of and refusal 
to recognize Israel as a nation. Ostensibly representing ideological polar 
opposites, or a “clash of civilizations”, it is difficult to imagine that these 
two inimical nations could have ever been allies. But for the first three 
decades of Israel‟s statehood, Iran was Israel‟s foremost regional and 
Muslim ally. The two nations were the American superpower‟s primary 
Middle Eastern allies and cooperated extensively to promote Western 
secular Capitalist values in the region while countering Soviet influence 
and the proliferation of Communism in the greater Middle East. The 
connection between Israel and Iran ran deeper than geopolitics; it 
reached back into the depths of Jewish and Persian history. Prior to the 
Iranian revolution in 1979, Israel was confident that Iran would remain an 
enduring, dependable ally. It is important to note that Israel coveted its 
alliance with Iran much more than Iran did with Israel. 
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Following the revolution and the sudden, dramatic reversal of the 
Shah‟s policy of full cooperation and accommodation of Western 
interests, it became counterintuitive for Israel to maintain its Periphery 
Doctrine. This foreign policy dictated that Israel needed (non-Arab) allies 
on the geographic periphery of the Middle East to counter the 
widespread (Arab) threat from the region‟s geographic core. Khomeini‟s 
ascension to the Iranian leadership heralded the era of explicit, 
incendiary anti-Israel discourse which continues to this day, but which 
Israeli leaders largely dismissed throughout the first decade of the Islamic 
Republic. Ancient Jewish relations with Persia played a part in Israel‟s 
reluctance to fully let go of its Iranian ties, but ultimately it was geopolitical 
and economic concerns that trumped ideological clashes and any 
potential threat emanating from the Ayatollahs in Tehran.  
Taking advantage of the political turmoil that followed the 
disintegration of the Shah‟s regime, Iraq invaded Iran, thrusting it into an 
eight-year war with approximately one million casualties. The hostage 
crisis at the American embassy in Tehran exacerbated Iran‟s political and 
economic isolation and left Iran without a source of arms to defend itself 
from Iraqi aggression. Israel took advantage of the opportunity and 
covertly supplied Iran with American made weapons and parts, without 
which Iran would likely have quickly lost the war. It was in Israel‟s interests 
3 
 
to weaken Iraq, whom it considered a greater, more immediate threat 
than Iran. While purchasing Israeli-provided arms for its devastating but 
domestically unifying war, Iran consistently railed against Israel as part of 
an attempt to spread its Islamic revolution and position itself as the 
champion against Western Colonialism and injustice. While Iran 
vehemently denied cooperation with the “Zionist Entity”, Israel continued 
to maintain ties with Iran in hopes of an eventual regime change. The 
Periphery Doctrine was finally abandoned in the early 1990‟s, when Israel 
emerged as the leading voice of a global anti-Iran crusade.  
The bulk of this thesis will focus on Israel‟s relationship with Iran during 
Khomeini‟s reign, which roughly corresponds to the first decade of the 
Islamic Republic and the entirety of the Iran-Iraq war; a conflict that was 
particularly formative in the development of this relationship. In order to 
best understand this turbulent period of Iranian-Israeli ties, it is crucial to 
consider the significant, controversial alliance that existed between Israel 
and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi prior to the revolution. However, 
bilateral relations in the post-Khomeini period fall beyond the scope of this 
work.  
In addition to chronicling the history of Iranian-Israeli relations, taking 
into account the Iranian revolution and other geopolitical shifts in the 
Middle East, I will look below the surface of Iranian-Israeli animosity and 
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examine the underlying factors that colored this complex relationship. I will 
explore the Iranian and Israeli narratives and compare the religious, 
historical, ideological and psycho-political underpinnings that reveal 
significant similarities between these two superficially diametrically 
opposed states, and ultimately shaped the Iranian-Israeli relationship. 
Through these analyses, I also aim to shed light on the power of 
nationalism in the face of compelling ideological forces. Finally, I will 
consider the complex politics of identity in each country and the role of its 




























  The Iranian Revolution, Khomeini, and the Iran-Iraq War 
 
Anti-Zionism and the Iranian Revolution  
The 1979 Iranian Revolution brought decades of a controversial but 
amicable relationship between Iran and Israel to an abrupt end, or so it 
seemed. Although Iran had never officially recognized the State of Israel1, 
the two nations constituted America‟s core Middle Eastern allies and 
were drawn to one another for various cultural, historical, and 
geostrategic reasons. These two non-Arab, Western-oriented nations 
engaged in a substantial amount of trade, including the sale of cheap oil 
to Israel and importation of foodstuffs to Iran. Israel maintained a de 
facto embassy, called the Israeli Interests Office, in Tehran throughout 
Reza Shah Pahlavi‟s reign, while Iran had a consulate general in 
Jerusalem.2 The most unnerving cooperative effort concerned the Shah‟s 
brutal secret police, SAVAK, which had been trained by Israel‟s Mossad3, 
and was ultimately responsible for the relentless attacks and murders of 
anti-Shah demonstrators that led up to the overthrow of the Shah.  
                                                        
1 In 1950, the Shah gave Israel de facto recognition, following Turkey’s example. 
2 Samuel Segev, Iranian Triangle (New York: Free Press, 1988) pg. 30 
3 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007) pg. 26 
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The leader in exile of the revolutionary anti-Shah movement, 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, had been denouncing the monarch‟s 
relations with Israel for years. From the ideological point of view 
embraced by Khomeini and many of his fellow Shi‟a clergymen, as well 
as much of Iran‟s religious populous, recognizing (even unofficially) and 
maintaining relations with Israel undermined the Islamic character and 
obligations of Iran. Because Israel was widely viewed in the Muslim world 
as fundamentally illegitimate and Zionism threatening to Islamic 
civilization, especially according to Khomeini‟s interpretation, the Shah‟s 
relationship with Israel was seen as offensive and traitorous by many 
Iranians. The bulk of Khomeini‟s speeches and oral propaganda stressed 
the idea that Zionism is the enemy of humanity and that Jews want to 
eradicate Islam and dominate the world. Thus, the rhetoric followed, 
Israel must be destroyed.  
The Shah‟s close ties to the U.S. and Israel led him to be widely 
viewed as a puppet of Western Imperialism and Zionism. Khomeini 
believed that the Shah had sold Iran‟s independence to Israel. Thus, 
opposition forces were working to free Iran from Israeli/Jewish domination 
and regain Iranian independence.4 The Shah‟s relationship with Israel was 
instrumental to his overthrow, and the struggle against Israel and Zionism 
                                                        
4 Behrooz Souresrafil, Khomeini and Israel (London: I Researchers Inc., 1988) pg. 31 
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became one of the major platforms of the revolution. The slogan “Death 
to Israel” was prevalent during the revolution and became a central 
theme of the Islamic Republic. 
Ironically, the Shah had become quite critical of Israel toward the 
end of his reign. He vocally opposed the Israeli occupation of Gaza and 
the West Bank, insisting that the United States force Israel to evacuate the 
occupied territories and recognize Palestinian rights. The Shah actively 
supported the Arab states in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 as part of a 
concerted effort towards improved relations with the Arab nations of the 
region. Consequently, throughout the 1970‟s Israeli-Iranian relations grew 
increasingly fragile. The assent of the right-wing Likud party in 1977 further 
strained the relationship.  
Nonetheless, the motley assortment of anti-Shah activists5 were 
largely united in condemning the monarchy‟s perceived obedience to 
the U.S. and the forces of Western Imperialism and Capitalism. Israel was 
regarded as the Middle Eastern outpost of the West‟s Imperialist reach; it 
symbolized the contemporary manifestation of European Colonialism.  
The arrogance, racism, deceit, and corruption associated with these 
                                                        
5 Anti-Shah activists included Communists, Islamists and those seeking a secular, pluralist 
democracy. Opponents of the Shah were Muslim, Jewish, Christian, Zoroastrian and Atheist. 
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invasive forces constituted the basis of the discontent of the Iranian 
masses toward the Shah, who embodied these despised qualities.  
Israel, for its part, proudly considered itself the “emissary of Western 
civilization in the Middle East”6 and empathized with what it considered 
the Shah‟s civilizing mission of bringing – by force if necessary - modernity, 
capitalism, and secularism to his country. In line with this thinking, military 
commander Ariel Sharon proposed sending Israeli paratroopers to Iran to 
rescue the Shah when his overthrow appeared imminent.7 Meanwhile, 
right-wing Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin criticized the Shah and 
promoted Khomeini.8 Begin was not alone among secularists who 
expressed a naïve optimism for the impending removal of the Shah and 
the return of the charismatic Ayatollah to Iran. 
 
Iranian Jews and the Revolution 
Although Iranian Jews owed their unprecedented legal protections 
and financial prosperity to the Shah‟s tolerant policies regarding 
minorities, many Jewish groups, including the Jewish Youth Organization 
and the Organization of Jewish Intellectuals were actively involved in the 
revolution against the monarchy. Jewish Iranians played an important 
                                                        
6 Haggai Ram, Iranophobia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009) pg. 6 
7 Israel Shahak, Open Secrets: Israeli Nuclear and Foreign Policies (Pluto Press, 1997) pg. 61 
8 Parsi, pg. 91 
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role in Communist circles, which stressed a heterogeneous membership. 
They joined their predominantly Muslim compatriots in denouncing Iran‟s 
relationship with Israel and the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. The 
unlikely cooperation of these political opponents of Israel and the Shah‟s 
domestic policies, with those Iranians whose opposition was based more 
on morality, ideology and religion is testament to just how widespread 
Iranian dissatisfaction with the monarchy had become.  
Upon returning, Khomeini immediately promised Iran‟s Jews that 
they would be able to live and worship freely under the Islamic Republic 
despite the fact that he despised Israel and Zionism. The day after 
Khomeini took command, thousands of Iranian Jews marched to the 
Ayatollah‟s headquarters in Tehran to express support for his victory and 
to affirm their opposition to Zionism.9 But just a few months later, Khomeini 
directly ordered the execution of Habib Elghanian, the head of the 
Tehran Jewish Society and symbolic head of the Iranian Jewish 
community, on charges of espionage, Zionism, and funding the Israeli 
Army.10 Elghanian denied all of the charges against him, but was 
executed nonetheless, as were numerous other Jews. These symbolic 
moves sent the unmistakable message that Iran was serious about its anti-
                                                        
9 Henry Paolucci, Iran, Israel, and the United States (Whitestone: Griffin House Publishers, 1991) pg. 
240 
10 Sohrab Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989) pg. 75 
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Zionist stand and would not tolerate the presence of Israeli spy networks 
or Mossad agents in Iran.  
 
Palestine Embraced 
Upon Khomeini‟s triumphant return to Iran on February 11, 1979, the 
armed forces and police joined the revolutionaries and took over the 
Israeli Interest Office in Tehran. On February 18, the Islamic Republic 
received its first foreign dignitary, PLO leader Yasser Arafat. The Israeli 
compound was immediately transferred to the PLO, ties with Israel were 
formally severed and all Israelis were expelled from the country. This was 
an incredibly significant event: a great source of pride for critics of Israel 
and a great blow to Israel and the West. The wealthiest nation in the 
Middle East, backed by a formidable, highly advanced military, was now 
headed by an outspoken adversary of Israel.  
Arafat expected financial and military aid to substantiate 
Khomeini‟s vocal support. But the Islamic Republic‟s support of the PLO 
remained limited to rhetoric. Prime minister Amir Entezam announced 
that, “Iran has made no decision to arm the Palestinians and is not 
concerned to use the Palestinian proletariat in the military or military-
industrial complex. We will fully support them in international 
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organizations”.11 At this stage, the Khomeini government recognized Iran‟s 
need to maintain relations with the United States, even as it was very 
critical of the legacy of American support for the Shah. Pro-Palestinian, 
anti-Israeli rhetoric was not necessarily a major hindrance to achieving this 
end, but funding Arafat and arming the PLO would have amounted to 
political suicide. Military action against Israel was proposed on several 
occasions, but was never a serious consideration.  
Khomeini gave the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a grandiose religious 
dimension that superseded its actual scope. Traditionally, opponents of 
Israel viewed the conflict as a violation of Palestinian sovereignty and an 
affront to Arab Nationalism. But Khomeini had claimed for years that 
Zionism represented an attack on all of Islam and even all of humanity, 
thereby denying it as a human rights issue or a nationalist cause and 
instead relegating it to an ideological realm. Upon assuming power, 
Khomeini‟s previously ideological statements acquired a calculated 
political aim. Iran would not be able to play a leading role in this cause if it 
remained an Arab issue. By accusing Zionism of threatening the Islamic 
world, Khomeini made it an Iranian cause as well. Like his deposed 
predecessor, Khomeini‟s main geopolitical aim was to establish Iran as the 
regional superpower. To legitimately assume this role, it was necessary that 
                                                        
11 Souresrafil, pg. 47  
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Iran befriend and command the respect of the numerous Arab States in 
the Middle East. Criticizing Israel was a good way to achieve this, as even 
the Shah himself had acknowledged. With Iran leading the anti-Zionist 
crusade, Western-allied Arab governments had to tread carefully not to 
oppose Iran too harshly, lest they appear in opposition to Iran‟s pro-
Palestinian position.  But the Islamic Republic‟s tactic of incessant verbal 
provocation of Israel failed to win the support of Arab governments. While 
the Arab masses may have been roused by Iran‟s boldness, Sunni Arab 
governments were deeply concerned by the Shi‟a Ayatollah‟s desire to 
spread Islamic revolution.  
Khomeini went on to mark the last Friday of Ramadan as Quds12 
Day, a call to Muslims around the world to voice their opposition to Israel 
and to demonstrate in support of Palestinian rights. In his 1979 
announcement, the Ayatollah proclaimed, “I have been notifying the 
Muslims of the danger posed by the usurper, Israel. I ask all the Muslims of 
the world and the Muslim governments to join together to sever the hand 
of this usurper and its supporters...and through a ceremony demonstrating 
the solidarity of Muslims worldwide, announce their support for the 
legitimate rights of the Muslim people."13 Quds Day did not receive the 
                                                        
12 Quds is the Persianized Arabic name for Jerusalem 
13 Samii, Bill. “Quds Day Brings out Anti-Israeli Sentiment” Radio Free Europe. www.Rferl.org 
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positive global response Khomeini had hoped for, and remained a largely 
Iranian, government orchestrated propaganda tactic. This Iranian display 
was a mockery of the Palestinian cause, for it merely highlighted Iran‟s 
unwillingness to provide material support to the Palestinians.  
The honeymoon between Khomeini and Arafat was short-lived, as 
practical support for the Palestinians did not materialize. Arafat and other 
Arab leaders were turned off by Khomeini‟s harsh criticisms of secularism.14 
When Saddam Hussein invaded the Iranian province of Khuzestan (which 
he referred to as Arabestan) in 1980, Arafat put his support behind Iraq, 
effectively ending his relationship with Khomeini. Iranian anti-Zionist, pro-
Palestinian rhetoric, on the other hand, continued to grow.   
 
Anti-Zionist Propaganda 
In addition to describing the fight against Zionism as a “Muslim 
religious crusade”15, establishing Quds Day, and delivering countless 
speeches demonizing Jews, Zionists, and Israel, Khomeini led a massive, 
multi-faceted propaganda campaign. The Islamic Republic issued 
Persian translations of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and sponsored 
an international, children‟s drawing and writing contest titled “Israel Must 
                                                        
14 Parsi, pg. 85 
15 David Menashri, Post-revolutionary Politics in Iran (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001) pg. 266 
14 
 
Be Erased from the Earth”.16 Iran also attempted to expel Israel from the 
United Nations on several occasions, and established monuments and 
numerous murals within Iran advocating the defeat of Zionism. 
 
Khomeini‟s government saw the need for the establishment of a 
revolutionary guard, called Sepah-e Pasdaran, loyal to the regime and its 
ideals. In addition to its policing and military activities, the Sepah 
published works of propaganda demonizing Israel, Zionism, Jews, the U.S., 
Western Imperialism, and even the “Zionist” government of Iraq. One of 
                                                        
16 Parsi, pg. 101 
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these publications, Jahan Zir-e Solteye Sehionism or The World under 
Zionist Domination, bears on its cover an illustration of a slightly deformed, 




The book‟s introduction begins by stating that Zionism is the enemy 
of Islam. It goes on to blame American propaganda for demonizing 
Muslims and for distorting the image of the Islamic revolution and the 
Islamic Republic. It refers to Zionists as Satan‟s children, and claims that 
Jews intend to take over the world, among other accusations. Another 
piece of propaganda literature, titled Iran-e Eslami dar Barabar-e 
Sehionism or Islamic Iran Against Zionism, claims that Israel tried to 
undermine the Islamic Republic from the beginning and has designs to 
establish a “Greater Israel” from the Nile to the Euphrates. The book, 
written after allegations of Israeli-Iranian arms deals were made public, 
vehemently (with a liberal usage of exclamation points) denies any claims 
of collaboration with Israel during the Iran-Iraq War. 
 
War with Iraq 
Several serendipitous events, including the student takeover of the 
American embassy in Tehran, allowed Khomeini to purge the moderate 
elements of the nascent government of the new Islamic Republic and 
consolidate power. But the instability of Khomeini‟s government and the 
domestic turmoil that ensued encouraged Saddam Hussein to invade 
Iran in September 1980, paving the way for a devastating confrontation 
that had worried the Shah for years. In one crucial sense, the Iraqi 
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invasion was a blessing for Khomeini, whose precarious position stabilized 
as the nation was forced to put aside internal political concerns and rally 
behind the government against the Arab aggressor. Separatist uprisings 
in Khuzestan, Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Baluchistan were eclipsed by the 
war with Iraq. By presenting an external enemy, the war with Iraq served 
to unite Iranians around a common nationalist cause. Accordingly, Jews 
were among the hundreds of thousands of Iranian men who joined to 
defend their nation against foreign aggression. Jewish and other minority 
soldiers were honored as martyrs by Khomeini‟s regime. The government 
could not afford to alienate willing fighters or sacrifice national cohesion, 
and was aware of the importance of promoting a tolerant image of the 
Islamic Republic. A prominent mural in Tehran stands testament to the 
Islamic Regime‟s recognition of war martyrs belonging to religious 
minorities. The mural, several stories tall, depicts the faces of five fallen 
Iranian soldiers: two Assyrian Christians, an Armenian Christian, a 
Zoroastrian and a Jew, each with his name written in Persian as well as in 
the script of his native language. Looming above the martyrs are the 
faces of Ayatollah Khomeini and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei along 
with a quote of Khomeini‟s that reads, “Religious minorities have a 
particular respect in Islam… and they stand as one with Muslims in service 








The war also presented Khomeini with a logistical nightmare. The 
Shah‟s massive stockpile of American made weapons now at Khomeini‟s 
disposal required American-made spare parts and replacements. But the 
takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the hostage crisis that ensued 
had led most Western industrialized nations – the same countries with 
access to American-made weapons and parts – to impose an economic 
embargo on Iran. To make matters worse, between 60 and 80% of Iran‟s 
military personnel had been purged, executed, or had fled the country 
due to monarchical or party affiliations which worried Khomeini‟s 
paranoid and overwhelmed fledgling government.17 Faced with 
international sanctions, Iran was unable to buy the reinforcements it 
needed to fight Iraq, who was backed and armed by the U.S. and the 
wealthy Arab Gulf States. Enter Israel, sworn enemy and unlikely 
benefactor of Khomeini in his time of dire desperation. Conveniently 
located only several hundred miles from Iran, America‟s closest ally had 
nearly unlimited access to American-made weapons and spare parts, 
and was enthusiastic in accepting the opportunity to enable Iran in its 
fight against Iraq. In fact, several months before the start of the war, Israel 
                                                        
17 Souresrafil pg. 58 
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had returned several American-built Iranian tanks that the Shah had sent 
to Israel to be refurbished.  
Initially, Israel openly declared its intention to deliver arms to Iran. 
Moshe Dayan, Israel‟s Foreign Affairs Minister, warned the West that Iraq 
would quickly win the war if Iran did not receive U.S.-made arms and 
parts.18 The United States, still reeling from the ongoing hostage crisis, 
rejected Israel‟s suggestion of arming Iran to help weaken Iraq. So Israel 
decided to go it alone. While Khomeini‟s government continued publicly 
lambasting Israel and Zionism on political and ideological grounds, Israeli 
military advisors were reportedly traveling to Iran to train Iranian 
technicians to repair and alter warplanes to accommodate Israeli made 
parts and bombs. Secret meetings between Colonel Zarrabi, the director 
of the Iranian military complex and Israeli colonel Ben-Youssef took place 
in Zurich while the U.S. was kept in the dark.19  
Furthermore, an influential Iranian cleric, Ahmad Kashani, personally 
visited Israel in 1980 to discuss arms sales and military cooperation against 
Iraq‟s nuclear facility at Osirak.20  Israel bombed Osirak in September 
1981, marking the first Israeli-Iranian cooperative effort in the war. Iran 
reportedly provided plans of the reactor and other directives to help 
                                                        
18 Souresrafil, pg. 60 
19 Carter had been planning to arrange a deal to sell Iran arms in exchange for the release of 
American hostages. He was livid when Israel’s covert dealings with Iran were discovered.  
20 Parsi, pg. 95 
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Israel successfully bomb the facility. In an effort to boost morale, Iran 
claimed responsibility for the crippling attack, but both Israel and Iraq 
stated that Israel was responsible.   
By this time in late 1981, the fate of the war and with it Khomeini‟s 
regime lay in Israel‟s hands. Of course Khomeini was in no position to 
publicly admit that the Islamic Republic, which had tried so hard to 
market itself as the bastion of Islamic resistance against Israel, was not 
only purchasing Israeli and American arms and parts, but was actively 
cooperating with Israel in the war. The bombing of the Osirak nuclear 
facility gave Saddam an excuse to expose the illicit relationship. Yasser 
Arafat protested Iran‟s hypocrisy, but the Islamic Republic was quick to 
refute any claims of collaboration.21 Hashemi Rafsanjani, then leader of 
the Iranian parliament, stated that, “the Zionist and Imperialist 
propaganda machines have already so poisoned minds against the 
Islamic Republic that it is now impossible to change world opinion. 
Nobody would believe that there is any greater enemy of Israel than the 
Islamic Republic. Despite the fact that we are still at war, the Military High 
Command Council decided to release Iraqi prisoners of war so that they 
could return to fight against Israel, and our revolutionary guards have 
                                                        
21 Parsi, pg. 107 
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said that they are ready to fight with Israel. This is not propaganda but 
the truth! Don‟t confuse our people!”  
The Iranian denials were rather convincing lies. The regime was 
confident that these reports could be easily manipulated to seem like 
poorly formulated enemy propaganda. But Rafsanjani‟s pleas convey a 
sense of desperation on the part of the Khomeini government. Ultimately, 
Iran was counting on the fact that a cooperative relationship between 
Iran and Israel simply seemed too implausible for much of the populace 
to believe, since it appeared so contrary to both country‟s principles.  
Unfortunately for the Khomeini government, an incident referred to 
as “November Tango” further exposed the ongoing relations between 
the two countries. When an Argentine cargo plane carrying U.S. made 
arms and Israeli ammunition to Tehran was shot down while flying over 
Soviet airspace, the Jerusalem Post picked up the story and soon the 
international media got hold of what appeared to be undeniable 
evidence of Israeli-Iranian arms transactions. Both Israeli and Iranian 
officials immediately denied any connection between the crash and any 
arms deal, although Israel‟s denial did not seem very genuine.22 Khomeini 
claimed that the November Tango incident was a fabrication and a plot 
against the revolution by social imperialists. The Ayatollah publicly 
                                                        
22 Segev, pg. 6 
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declared, “From the beginning we were against the Zionist tribe. Prior to 
this revolution, the Pahlavi regime was constantly connected with the 
corrupt Israeli government and this is why we were always opposed to 
Pahlavi. Now they accuse us of buying arms from Israel. If we don‟t 
regard them as human, how could we deal with them? When we started 
this movement, one of our major issues was to eradicate Israel from the 
Earth. Why do they want to prove that we are supporters of Israel? Please 
brothers, see with your own eyes if we are fighting with Israeli arms or with 
the arms of fate”.23 
Repeating the regime‟s standard tactic, Khomeini appeals to his 
audience‟s logic as well as their faith in God. He reiterates the ideology 
of the Islamic revolution, but also pleads with his audience to “see with 
their own eyes”, manipulating their sense of reason. He is essentially 
asking them: does it make any sense that Iran would buy weapons from 
the Zionist enemy? Of course not! Logic says that this would be ridiculous. 
Therefore, these are clearly lies. By suggesting that Iranian soldiers are 
fighting with “arms of fate” as opposed to Israeli arms, Khomeini alludes 
to the divine realm, appealing to the people‟s faith that God is on their 
side and is surely assisting them in their noble struggle. 
                                                        
23 Souresrafil, pg. 71 
24 
 
Khomeini‟s willingness to buy arms from his proclaimed arch-nemesis 
was so deeply hypocritical that it was sincerely difficult for his followers to 
acknowledge. In a special message celebrating the month of pilgrimage 
to Mecca, Khomeini continued his propaganda offensive, claiming that 
“this ridiculous claim about relations with Israel was created by the 
propaganda machine of the U.S.”, and that “the issue is not Iranian 
relations with Israel, but the essential problem is imperialism between East 
and West”. Here Khomeini attempts to shift the focus away from what he 
claims to be distracting propaganda and to instead concentrate on the 
bigger picture, namely that the Muslim world‟s fundamental struggle is 
the fight against Western Imperialism. 
The Iranian government stuck with their story, but Khomeini‟s 
credibility was badly damaged. Saddam Hussein assured his Arab 
supporters of the Israeli-Iranian arms deals, and a member of the Israeli 
government, which remained divided regarding concealment of the 
arms deals, publicly stated that “Iraq is our first enemy. One of the major 
reasons for cooperation between the two countries is the likely access of 
Iraq to the atomic bomb and its unconditional support of the PLO”. He 
added that the Iranian government had expressed its satisfaction with 
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Israeli support for Shiites in southern Lebanon.24 In reality, Khomeini had 
little choice but to continue buying arms from Israel, which allowed the 
Iranian military to achieve otherwise unimaginable victories. In a 
remarkable example of Iran‟s duplicitous anti-Israel propaganda, the 
biggest military victory against Iraq in 1981 was an operation named “The 
Road to Jerusalem”. Ironically, this victory was made possible entirely 
because of arms and parts provided by Israel.  
While Prime Minister Shimon Peres continued to deny claims of an 
arms deal, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon acknowledged it and reasoned 
in an interview in 1982 that “everybody knows the Ayatollah is a dictator, 
but we have no other choice except to keep a window open toward 
Iran for the day the war would be over and somebody else would take 
control in Iran. This does not mean we are supporting the Ayatollah.” 
Overshadowing the criticism he received from some members of the 
government for so bluntly discussing Israel‟s strategy was the fact that the 
continuation of the war, with the help of the Israeli arms deals, had 
greatly reduced Iraq‟s military capability, significantly decreasing the 
threat posed to Israel.  
The Islamic Republic‟s campaign of disinformation seemed futile by 
this point, but it had to persist to maintain a veneer of credibility. In 
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reaction to Sharon and other Israeli officials‟ admissions, Khomeini 
continued denying any arms deal. Yet the international community was 
well aware of these transactions. In March 1982, the New York Times 
printed a series of documents indicating that Israel had sold over $100 
million in arms to Iran over the past 18 months, including 45,000 Uzi 
machine guns. By 1984, the value of the arms deals topped $500 million. 
In exchange, Iran was selling Israel oil at a 25% discount.25 The 
collaborative efforts came to include Syria as well, who assisted its enemy 
Israel by shipping 40 truckloads of weapons a day to Iran via Turkey.26 
Israel claimed that the arms and ammunition it was selling to Iran were 
only those seized from the PLO in Lebanon, but the exceedingly large 
quantity of weapons transferred, as well as the fact that it had begun 
transferring the weapons prior to its invasion of Lebanon suggest that this 
was not entirely true.  
 
Lebanon 
Israel invaded Lebanon in the summer of 1982 in an attempt to oust 
Arafat and the PLO from the country in which it was based and from 
which it was coordinating attacks against Israel. Iran immediately 
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announced its condemnation of the Israeli aggression and went so far as 
to send about 1,500 Iranian volunteer fighters to Lebanon, but the 
modest effort proved problematic. Several Iranian soldiers were captured 
by Israeli troops, while 23 were killed in an Israeli air raid on their barracks 
in Lebanon‟s Baalbek Valley.27  
In light of the Israeli invasion, Saddam offered to make peace with 
Iran and suggested cooperating in Lebanon against Israel, but Khomeini 
refused. He viewed the conflict in Lebanon as a distraction from his war 
with Iraq. In spite of the tens of thousands of Iranian lives lost in the first 
few years alone, Khomeini depended on the continued struggle against 
Iraq to ensure his regime‟s survival. Committed to prolonging the war, he 
ordered the Iranian troops to return from Lebanon and declared that the 
road to Quds went through Karbala.28 Furthermore, Khomeini surely 
understood that fighting Israel directly in the Lebanese theater would 
jeopardize his access to the Israeli-facilitated weapons and parts on 
which he relied so greatly.  
But Iran‟s involvement in Lebanon was just beginning. As the 
Lebanese Shi‟a grew increasingly frustrated by the prolonged presence 
of their Israeli occupiers (whom they had originally welcomed to help rid 
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Lebanon of the PLO presence) they immediately turned to Iran for 
assistance. Khomeini saw in this marginalized community of coreligionists 
a great opportunity to realize his goal of exporting the Islamic Revolution. 
His aim was not so much to use the Shi‟a militias as a proxy to fight Israel 
as it was a way to increase Iranian relevance and potency in the Muslim 
world. Iran‟s Deputy Foreign Minister, Hossein Zadeh, became the 
unofficial “high commissioner” for Lebanon, making frequent trips to 
Damascus to oversee arms shipments and funds transfers to Shi‟a militias 
in Lebanon.29 Whereas he had been unsuccessful in appealing to the 
Shi‟a majority populations of Bahrain and Iraq, Khomeini‟s vocal, financial 
and military support of what came to be Hezbollah succeeded in 
establishing a lasting Iranian foothold in an Arab country. Indeed, as 
American, French and British troops left the war-torn country in 1983, only 
the Syrian army and the Iranian-led Hezbollah remained as the major 
forces within Lebanon.30 
 
Iranian Rationale 
 Although driven by ideological zeal, the complex demands of 
governance led to the compromise of Khomeini‟s Islamic ideology and a 
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turn towards pragmatic foreign policy. Simply put, Khomeini was 
desperate for weapons, but he also saw in Israel a channel through which 
to revive relations with the United States. Khomeini recognized that 
reconciling with the “Great Satan”, with whom he had not initially 
intended to cut diplomatic ties, would be necessary to achieve his 
ultimate goal: the survival of his regime and ideology. In a 1979 speech, 
Khomeini declared his intentions to “establish our very ordinary relations 
with America just as with other countries, provided that our noble country 
grants permission”.31 Israel accepted the role of intermediary, and the 
head of the Israeli Foreign Ministry David Kimche acknowledged his 
country‟s desire to “serve as a bridge between Iran and the West”32, for 
Iran served an important strategic interest for Israel. Israel, on the other 
hand, had never been of primary importance to Iran. Instead, Israel was 
used as a tool to help Iran get closer to the United States. But missed 
opportunities and increasingly complex circumstances rendered 
Khomeini‟s hope to eventually reestablish ties with the U.S. 
insurmountable.  
The religious elements of the revolution that had usurped power 
criticized the Shah‟s authoritarianism, corruption, and lack of moral 
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integrity, exemplified by the “Westoxification” of Iran that he facilitated. 
Khomeini himself had damned the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and 
rejected subsequent peace plans that accommodated or 
acknowledged Israel as a legitimate nation. But upon assuming power, 
the ideological clerics were faced with the realities of politics. While the 
Islamic Republic continued its constant rants against the U.S., Israel and 
Western Imperialism, Iran maintained ties with Hafez Assad of Syria (who 
was bent on crushing Islamic fundamentalism in his own country), Turkey 
and Pakistan (two secular Western-allied nations), and Israel, the regime‟s 
ultimate symbol of unjust Western Imperialism and the great enemy of Iran 
and Islam.  
Iran‟s strategy of continuing its intense anti-Israeli rhetoric amid its 
clandestine arms deals with the Jewish State served two purposes. First, it 
was intended to cover up its dealings with Israel. Second, it was a feeble 
attempt by Iran to gain Arab support, even as it was fighting a war 
against a major Arab state that enjoyed broad support from Arab 
governments and was well funded by the Arab Gulf states. Easing tensions 
with the Arab States and gaining their admiration was a prerequisite for 
Khomeini‟s goal of regional hegemony. But Khomeini‟s government 
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insisted that its denunciations of Israel were not about geopolitical gains, 
but rather about Palestinian justice and Islamic honor.33 
An Israeli businessman who had recently traveled to Tehran was 
anonymously quoted in the Paris-based La Liberation in March 1986 
explaining the Iranians‟ justification for trading with their alleged Zionist 
enemies. According to his account, Khomeini believed that “although 
Israel is a Satan, at present the circumstances have forced us to sign a 
contract with the Satan”. This justification echoes Israel‟s claim that 
although “Khomeini is a dictator” (not to mention that he regularly 
threatens to annihilate Israel) extenuating circumstances necessitate 
cooperation with this otherwise reprehensible government.  
Another example pertains to Khomeini‟s position on weapons of 
mass destruction. Throughout the war with Iraq, Khomeini opposed the 
development of nuclear weapons, which he associated with the immoral, 
belligerent (Capitalist) West. As the war drew to a close, the Ayatollah‟s 
moral and ideological opposition was overshadowed by the realities of 
the capabilities of modern warfare. In light of the Iraqis‟ use of chemical 
weapons against Iranians during the war, Khomeini came to realize that 
Iran had no choice but to develop nuclear weapons to serve as a 
deterrent to potential future attacks.  
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Anti-Semitism, Khomeini, and the Islamic Republic 
It is important to note that Iran had been plagued by anti-Semitic 
sentiment, laws, and conflict for centuries. Anti-Zionist revolutionary 
rhetoric, while manipulated to appear political, points to an anti-Semitism 
sentiment that runs deep in the Iranian Shi‟a narrative. Well before the 
revolution, such bigotry was prevalent among Iran‟s Shi‟a clergy and 
among much of the population. Khomeini himself, in the provocative 
speeches that compelled the Shah to banish him from Iran, railed against 
the Zionist threat against Iran and Islam. He declared in a speech in 1963, 
“I must warn all the Muslims of the world and the nation of Iran that the 
Koran and Islam are in danger, and the independence of the country 
and its economy have almost fallen in the hands of the Zionists in the 
form of the Baha‟i Party. It will not take long for them to take over the 
entire country and rapidly impoverish the Moslem people. Iranian 
television is the spy center of Jews.” At a demonstration in that same 
year, among shouts of “Death to the Shah” and “Long Live Khomeini”, 
the charismatic cleric expanded on his claim that the Shah was selling 
Iran to Israel and the Jews. He said, “Mr. Shah, don‟t obey the Israelis. 
Israel is no good for you. Israel is very dangerous for Islam and Moslems. 
SAVAK tells us we should not talk about Israel. Tell me, what is the 
relationship between you and Israel? What does it mean when SAVAK 
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warns us not to talk about you or Israel? Does it mean that in the eyes of 
SAVAK the Shah is Israeli? Does it mean that in the eyes of SAVAK you are 
a Jew?” In criticizing the Shah‟s cooperation with Israel, Khomeini attacks 
the Shah by suggesting that he is a Jew. The implied insult reflects the 
anti-Jewish sentiment at the core of Khomeini‟s ideology.  
Khomeini‟s pre-revolution work Al-Hukuma al-Islamiyya insists that, 
“Since its inception, the Islamic movement has been afflicted with the 
Jews, for it was they who first established anti-Islamic propaganda and 
joined in various stratagems, and as you can see, this activity continues 
to this day.” The Ayatollah accused Jews of distorting Islam, manipulating 
the Quran, taking over Iran‟s economy, and plotting to take over the 
world.34 In a 1982 speech, Khomeini commented that Christians are even 
worse than Jews, even if it was “impossible to say that there is something 
worse than Jews”. He quickly added, “I mean the Jews of Israel”.35 Being 
mindful of the tolerant façade he needed to present to the world, 
Khomeini was careful not to appear blatantly racist. In this instance, his 
clarification that Israeli Jews were the target of his criticism disguised his 
racism as political criticism. But in Khomeini‟s response to the November 
Tango incident, he stated that, “we oppose the Zionist tribe”, not the 
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Israeli government or even the Zionist movement. That an element of 
anti-Semitism drove the Islamic Republic‟s uncompromising anti-Israeli 
stance is evident. 
Iran had no legitimate basis for political conflict with Israel. Iran was 
neither an Arab country nor was it geographically affected by the Zionist 
conquest of Palestine. The idea that Jews were infringing upon holy 
Muslim territory deeply offended much of the religious establishment and 
its adherents. As discussed earlier, Iran‟s rants against Israel were ultimately 
intended to achieve political goals: to increase Arab support for Iran in an 
effort to legitimize Iran‟s aim of becoming the regional superpower and to 
rally the Iranian people behind the regime‟s revolutionary narrative, which 
posited the Shah‟s dealings with Israel as the essence of his corruption and 
treachery. 
Once the revolution was complete, the clerics‟ anti-Semitic rhetoric 
gave way to more balanced statements that indicated Zionists, as 
members of a colonialist political movement, and not Jews as a whole, as 
the perpetrators of an inexcusable attack on Islam.  Jews, they reasoned, 
constitute a religious group, not a nation. Therefore, Jews were not 
entitled to a state of their own, and certainly not in the heart of the Islamic 
World. In any case, Iran needed weapons and parts, and Israel was willing 




               The Israeli Narrative and the Iranian Revolution 
 
Israeli Rationale for Ties with Khomeini 
There are several important reasons why Israel was willing to supply 
Iran with weapons during its war with Iraq. First and foremost, Israel‟s most 
imminent military threat at the end of the 1970‟s came not from 
Khomeini, but from Saddam Hussein. Whereas Iranian rhetoric was 
considered hollow during this period, Israel was genuinely concerned 
with Iraq‟s military capability and its role within the greater Arab cause of 
defeating Israel. Iraq had been a main participant in every Arab-Israeli 
conflict since 1947 and was actively pursuing nuclear weapons 
development at its Osirak facility. By facilitating Iran‟s military effort 
against Iraq, Israel was able to simultaneously weaken both the 
established Iraqi threat and the potential Iranian threat. In doing so, Israel 
effectively eliminated, or at least postponed, the possibility of a major 
state-led attack against it.36 
Secondly, it was in Israel‟s economic interest to sell arms to Iran. The 
large-scale sale of weapons was a great boon for Israel‟s battered 
                                                        
36 Egypt, who had been the voice of Arab resistance and anti-Israeli rhetoric for decades, had just 
signed the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel, thereby leaving Israel more secure than ever.  
36 
 
economy. International sanctions against Iran meant that Israel would 
have a monopoly on arms sales to the Islamic Republic, and as the war 
raged on year after year Israel was guaranteed a steady, substantial flow 
of income from arms deals. 
The third reason concerned Iran‟s large and prosperous Jewish 
community. As the self-proclaimed guardian of the world‟s Jews, Israel 
viewed relations with the Islamic Republic as a strategic policy. 
Maintaining contact with Iran, through the sale of arms or otherwise, 
guaranteed access to Iran‟s Jewish community and facilitated Israel‟s 
ability to safeguard the community. This was especially pressing after 
widespread confiscations and allegations of espionage plagued Iran‟s 
Jewish community after the revolution. These incidents confirmed the 
Israeli narrative concerning the plight of exilic Jews, according to which 
Jews in exile (outside of Israel) were necessarily oppressed and unsafe, 
and could only find redemption and security once they “returned” to 
Israel.37 Israel‟s ultimate goal was the transfer of Iran‟s Jewish community 
to Israel, whose demographic war with its Arab citizens left it desperate 
for Jewish immigrants. 38  In fact, Khomeini allowed Iranian Jews to 
emigrate largely as a result of Israel‟s willingness to provide him invaluable 
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arms.39 In the early 1980‟s tens of thousands of Iranian Jews left Iran, 
mainly for North America and Israel, but were forced to leave behind 
much of their assets and possessions.  
Israel benefitted from the continuation of the war in another more 
nuanced way. Most Arab leaders felt an obligation to support Saddam, a 
fellow Arab. But opposing Iran, the leading voice of resistance against 
Israel and Zionism, was a precarious position to take. Nonetheless, 
Khomeini found an ally in Syrian president Hafez Al-Assad, who despised 
Saddam, causing great strife within the Arab community. Meanwhile, 
multiple Arab militias were slaughtering each other in Lebanon, causing 
further internal discord. Such discord gave the Israelis a sense of security, 
for it minimized the possibility of any sort of organized Arab attack against 
the Jewish State.  
 
Israel‟s justifications for its seemingly traitorous arms deals with Iran 
are logical in a geopolitical context. Nonetheless, in retrospect it appears 
rather shortsighted and self-defeating to arm a fundamentalist theocratic 
regime constantly reiterating its desire to exterminate your country. Israel 
did not take Iran‟s incendiary rhetoric seriously at this stage, and rightfully 
so. The Israelis were well aware that Khomeini‟s support of Palestinian 
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resistance and sovereignty began and ended with rhetoric. Furthermore, 
although it is easily forgotten today, Israel and much of the world 
believed Khomeini‟s regime would soon fall, and the regime itself was 
well aware of this possibility. Not only was Iran‟s fundamentalist regime 
isolated from without, but it also faced multi-faceted opposition from 
within. In fact, many coup plots were attempted and foiled by the 
Khomeini regime, which was deeply paranoid and on high alert for such 
schemes, in the early years after the revolution. It is safe to say that most 
world leaders hoped for and expected the impending demise of the 
regime, if not before Khomeini‟s approaching death – he was 77 when 
he assumed power - then certainly upon his death.  
In accordance with Israel‟s acute desire to hold on to its Periphery 
Doctrine, Israel saw benefit in maintaining a logistical connection with the 
Iranian armed forces, whom it was assumed would remain loyal to a 
more moderate regime, were one to replace Khomeini‟s government. An 
Iranian victory over Iraq was necessary, not only to diminish the Iraqi 
threat, but also to facilitate an eventual restoration of Israeli-Iranian 
relations similar to that which existed before the revolution, when Israel 
could count on a steady flow of cheap Iranian oil and a balance to its 
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more immediate Arab threat.40 Ariel Sharon, one of Israel‟s more 
outspoken proponents of maintained relations with Iran, explained to U.S. 
officials in 1981 that Khomeini‟s extremist ideology did not negate the 
importance of Iran as a key country in the region, and that it was to the 
West‟s advantage to keep low-key contacts with Khomeini‟s 
government, particularly with the military circles.41 Sharon spoke for many 
Israeli leaders who did not consider cooperating with Iran a contradiction 
to their opposition to Khomeini. Likewise, Khomeini‟s willingness to deal 
with Israel did not compromise the sincerity of his contempt for Zionism.  
The deep irony here is that, without Israeli arms and support, it is very 
unlikely that Khomeini‟s regime could have survived in those early days. 
After the fall of the monarchy, revolutionary militias had destroyed the 
Shah‟s military computers that held records of weapons and parts. They 
had little knowledge of the arms at their disposal or how to operate them 
due to the fact that so many of the Shah‟s military leaders had been killed 
or had fled the country.  
 
Israeli rhetoric regarding the Islamic Republic throughout the 1980‟s 
was surprisingly restrained. Israel assumed that an isolated, belligerent, 
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fundamentalist dictatorship simply could not survive long, and would 
surely be replaced by a more moderate government upon the death of 
the regime‟s charismatic octogenarian leader. Furthermore, Israel made 
no serious attempt to hide its arms sales to Iran, and refrained from 
excessive criticism of the Islamic Regime. At the time it would have 
appeared rather hypocritical to demonize Iran, whose war with Iraq was 
steadily destroying the Arab nation‟s ability to act upon its own threats to 
obliterate Israel. Israel had more pressing, established threats to deal with 
than the nascent Iranian menace. In spite of the remarkable but fragile 
peace with Egypt, Israel still felt during the 1980‟s that it was surrounded by 
enemies, bitter from previous Israeli military defeats, and bent on 
eliminating the Jewish State. This concern formed the basis and rationale 
of Israel‟s Periphery Doctrine. 
 
Israel’s Periphery Doctrine 
The Periphery Doctrine was the brainchild of Israel‟s founding father, 
David Ben Gurion, and came to dominate Israeli foreign policy for the first 
four decades of statehood. The doctrine was based on the improbability 
of building peace with Israel‟s hostile Arab neighbors and was meant to 
counter the Arab threat which overlapped the great, looming threat of 
Soviet influence in the region. In light of this, the Jewish State sought to 
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build alliances with the non-Arab, periphery states of the region; namely 
Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia, as well as regional minority groups like the Kurds 
and Lebanese Christians.  This outlook assured Israel an important sense of 
security in the form of regional allies, which it hoped would balance the 
threat from its more immediate Arab neighbors. The first seeds of doubt 
regarding this foundation of Israel‟s regional foreign policy were sown in 
the late 1970‟s when the prospect of peace with Egypt, Israel‟s primary 
enemy, materialized. As the champion of Arab unity and Nationalism, 
Gamal Abd-al Nasser‟s anti-Israel rhetoric was legendary, and his alliance 
with the Soviets pushed Israel ever closer to the extremely anti-Soviet, 
Western-allied Shah of Iran. Nasser‟s death in 1972 and his successor‟s shift 
toward the West resulted in an unlikely peace deal in 1979 between 
Anwar Sadat‟s new Egypt and Begin‟s new Israel; a milestone that 
suddenly and significantly altered the dynamics of the region.  
The replacement of the Western-allied Shah with a vehemently anti-
Western Cleric in Iran forced Israel to begin rethinking it‟s cherished 
Periphery Doctrine. The foundation of the doctrine, the assumption that 
peace with Israel‟s Arab foes was impossible, had been disproved. 
Meanwhile, Israel‟s primary and most powerful Periphery ally was now 
attempting to spread its Islamic Revolution across the region while 
regularly calling for the destruction of Israel. But Iran was too strategically 
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important for Israel to let go of. It‟s location at the edge of the Arab world, 
its history of economic and political ties to Israel, its enmity with Iraq and 
the Soviet Union, and its oil made Iran an irreplaceable ally. With much 
debate within the Israeli government, throughout the 1980‟s Israel chose 
not to abandon its Periphery Doctrine, and therefore maintained limited 
contact with Iran in hopes of eventually reestablishing a positive 
relationship.  
 
The demise of Israel‟s Periphery Doctrine finally came in the early 
1990‟s. A new school of thought was emerging in Israel that viewed the 
periphery not as a counterweight to the radical inner circle of Arab states, 
but rather as the perpetrator of radicalism.42  Israel, among others, began 
to recognize the likelihood that the Islamic Republic would endure, even 
after Khomeini‟s death. Meanwhile, the core Arab states were becoming 
increasingly moderate and were unified in their opposition to the stated 
Iranian goal of spreading the Islamic revolution. Egypt and Israel were at 
peace, Iraq was forced into a Western alliance against Iran, and the 
Syrian threat had been largely quelled as a result of the Lebanese 
conflict.  The complete abandonment of the Periphery Doctrine after the 
Oslo Accords in 1993 and the increasing possibility of peace with the 
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Arabs would significantly alter Israel‟s foreign policy. Iran‟s hollow threats 
would no longer be dismissed, and Israel would come to lead the world in 
a global anti-Iran crusade.  
 
The Israeli Narrative 
During its first 30 years as a nation, Israel maintained a 
predominantly European Socialist orientation, was ruled almost exclusively 
by Ashkenazi Jews, and promoted an unapologetic system of assimilation 
in forming a modern, secular Jewish Israeli society. The millions of Middle 
Eastern, African, and Asian Jews that made aliyah were encouraged to 
forget their Eastern cultures and identities and become Israeli (read 
European). 
As a secular movement born out of post-Enlightenment Europe, the 
Zionist project had no intention of culturally being a part of the Middle 
East. This is one of the great paradoxes of Zionism. While calling for a return 
to the Middle Eastern “Jewish homeland”, the movement intended from 
the start to orient itself exclusively toward the West. Zionists overwhelmingly 
abhorred the backward religiosity of Middle Easterners, regardless of 
religion, and viewed the state-sanctioned assimilation of Jewish 
immigrants as a noble civilizing mission.  This utopian Zionist vision was a 
product of the prevailing Colonialist mindset of 19th century Europe, and 
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rejected any appreciation of Eastern values in its nation-building project. 
Like Israel, the Shah‟s Iran was looking to Europe for social, cultural, and 
political guidance and looked upon its indigenous customs and values 
with disdain.   
It was in this epistemological context that Israelis experienced the 
Iranian Revolution. The Israeli media and public, along with much of the 
secular world, were deeply perplexed by what they perceived to be a 
regressive revolution. As the world progressed toward modernity and 
secularism, abandoning religiosity for Reason, the Iranian Revolution 
seemed to defy this logic. Israeli intellectuals and media refused to view 
the 1979 revolution as an intellectually formative event.43 Israelis treasured 
their special relationship with Iran, their anti-Arab Western-allied 
counterpart, and the Shah was widely seen as an innovator in line with the 
world‟s march towards secular modernity. Therefore resistance to his rule 
was seen as little more than Muslim zealotry opposed to progress. The 
Israeli newspaper HaTsofeh stated during the revolution that the Iranians 
are “simple-minded and ignorant masses” for which “religious slogans are 
far more powerful than democracy, civil rights and social justice.” Many 
Western observers simply could not fathom such a mass uprising against 
what they perceived to be a modern, progressive (albeit harsh) secular 
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ruler in favor of an aging cleric who advocated a return to antiquated 
Islamic values. This contradicted the basis of Western epistemology in 
which time moves linearly forward and societal progress is measured in 
terms of movement away from the archaic and towards the innovative; 
away from religion and towards science and Reason. In this context, the 
Iranian Revolution appeared to be fundamentally irrational. 
The unprecedented defeat of the dominant secular quasi-Socialist 
Labor Party in 1977 was significant for Israel not only politically, but also in 
terms of Israeli identity.  With massive support from Orthodox, Ultra-
Orthodox, and Mizrahi Jews (those of “Eastern” origin44) the right wing 
Likud Party came to power and for the first time included an Ultra-
Orthodox party, Agudat Israel, in its coalition government. This marked a 
significant shift in the secular Zionist ideology that had prevailed in Israel 
since 1948. Menachem Begin‟s Likud-led government also radically 
altered the way Israel dealt with the territories occupied in the 1967 war, 
giving legitimacy to the Gush Emunim settler movement in the West Bank, 
and unilaterally annexing the Golan Heights. During this period, frustrated 
Likud supporters began voicing their opposition, violently at times, to the 
Labor Party and the secular Ashkenazi establishment. Many secular Israelis 
perceived a disturbing resemblance between these often Mizrahi (dark-
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skinned) dissenters and the religious “mobs” in Tehran; in 1979, leftist 
Knesset member Yossi Sarid referred to Hebron‟s religious settlers as 
“Khomeini-style fanatics”. Israeli professor Michael Harsagor also warned 
of these similarities when he commented that the Ultra-Orthodox and 
religious Zionist parties‟ objection to autopsy, abortion, women‟s rights and 
even theater plays ”puts them in one front with the old man who is turning 
Iran upside down”.45 When right-wing opponents threw tomatoes at 
Shimon Peres during an election rally, he responded by shouting “You are 
a Khomeini-like unruly mob! Go back to Persia where your future 
belongs”.46 Throughout the 1980‟s the rift between secular left-leaning 
Israelis and the religious-allied right wing grew steadily in favor of the 
latter.       
Some Mizrahi members of the Agudat Israel religious party later 
defected and established the Shas Party, which was associated 
specifically with religious and Ultra-Orthodox Mizrahi Jews. The party 
decried the second-class status of Mizrahi Jews in Israeli society, 
something most Ashkenazi Jews were not aware of or didn‟t consider a 
major concern. Fear of the de-secularization or “Iranization” of Israel fed 
the reluctance of secular Western-oriented Israelis to appreciate Eastern 
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elements and values within Israeli society, a significant issue given that 
fact that Israel was, after all, located in the heart of the Middle East and a 
majority of its populace was of Middle Eastern origin47. Anxiety surrounding 
the emergence of an Ultra-Orthodox Mizrahi party prompted Meretz, a 
left wing party to coin the simple yet provocative campaign slogan Kan 
Lo Iran, “This is not Iran”.48  
 
Initially Israel saw little to gain and much to lose from the overthrow 
of the Shah and what appeared to be an Islamic, and therefore anti-
Israeli, revival. Thus it was very difficult for Israelis to sympathize with the 
anti-Shah revolutionaries, whose actions were set to deprive Israel of its 
most important regional ally. But Israeli politicians, intellectuals and much 
of the public were not totally ignorant of the underlying reasons that 
prompted this unprecedented modern revolution. As late as 1978, Israeli 
government, academic, and media outlets recognized the Shah‟s iron 
fisted rule and the serious problems present in Iranian society, including “a 
dearth of human resources, severe communication problems, massive 
and rapid rural to urban migration and a subsequent housing shortage, 
transportation difficulties, and a rapidly increasing gap between rich and 
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poor exacerbated by hyper-inflation”.49  But as the anti-Shah movement 
took a decisively Islamist turn, many Israeli observers chose to ignore the 
concrete historical evidence of widespread injustice and oppression 
perpetrated by the Shah and SAVAK, as if criticizing the Shah at this stage 
was tantamount to support for the Islamists. This was especially true after 
the hostage crisis. 
 
Following the Iranian Revolution and the death of the old Iran that 
Israel had embraced so warmly, the term “Persia” was largely relinquished 
in Israeli discourse in favor of “Iran”, which undoubtedly carried a very 
different connotation. The nostalgic, heroic images conjured up by 
“Persia” were no longer relevant. Indeed the new Iran itself tried hard to 
repress its pre-Islamic past which both the Shah and Israel had glorified 
and romanticized. In light of the perplexing Iranian revolution, Israelis 
began to see Persia as Iran; a backward, deeply religious society hostile to 
Israel and Jews, just like the rest of the Middle East. The timing of this great 
shift turned out to be rather serendipitous in that it occurred concurrently 
with two other major shifts; the rise of the conservatives in Israel, and the 
Camp David Peace Treaty with Egypt. The concurrence of these three 
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events enabled Israeli leaders to conveniently shift their external enemy 
from the Arab core to the non-Arab periphery.  
Haggai Ram, among other Israeli critics, opines that Israel needed 
an existential threat in order to reign in internal strife and maintain unity 
within the Israeli populace. In other words, if Khomeini didn‟t exist, Israel 
would have had to invent him. In 1979, with U.S. president Jimmy Carter 
serving as intermediary, Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty and 
normalized relations, to the shock of Israelis, Arabs, and much of the rest of 
the world. Israel agreed to return the occupied Sinai back to its former 
enemy in exchange for peace, a prospect that only a few years earlier 
would have seemed nearly impossible. Meanwhile, Iran was experiencing 
a complete reversal of its political power structure. The new Islamic 
Republic identified Israel as its primary enemy, and in doing so, helped 
Israel in an unexpected way.  
Over the course of the previous several decades, Israelis had fought 
several wars and had developed a deep animosity toward their Arab 
neighbors, elements of which had resorted to terrorist tactics in their 
struggle against Israeli conquest. Although the various attacks, hostage 
takings, massacres, and bombings against Israelis were not perpetrated 
exclusively by Muslims, the connection between Islam and terrorism was 
well established in the collective mindset of Israeli Jews. The Iranian 
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Revolution was significant in that it thrust the phenomenon of Islamic 
terrorism to an entirely new level, to the benefit of Israel. The hostage crisis 
of 1979-1981, in which a group of Iranian students stormed the American 
Embassy in Tehran and held its employees hostage for 444 days, created 
a spectacle for the world and elevated Islamic terrorism50 from an 
obscure Middle Eastern method of guerrilla warfare to a state-level tactic 
with global implications. Prior to this media-dominating event Islamic 
terrorism was perpetrated almost exclusively by militias and other non-
governmental organizations like the PLO, the Islamic Brotherhood, and 
various Lebanese militias, but no government had ever directly 
perpetrated such an attack. At the time of the hostage crisis in 1979, the 
U.S. was not yet involved in the Lebanese Civil War or in any other Middle 
Eastern or Muslim conflict; instead the American government and public 
were preoccupied with Cold War hysteria and were shocked by 
Khomeini‟s decision to endorse the embassy takeover.51 This American 
awakening to the scope of Islamic anti-Western terrorism played right into 
the hands of Israel, whose collective victim complex was affirmed by the 
new, looming Islamic Iranian threat.  
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The images of angry “Muslim” mobs in the streets of Tehran and the 
audacious takeover of the embassy of the most powerful nation on Earth 
confirmed the Israeli government‟s belief in the paramount importance 
of/obsession with national security, as well as the prevalent belief that 
Muslims (and other Middle Easterners) were irrational and violent. The all-
encompassing extremist Islamic nature of the newly formed Islamic 
Republic was frightening to many Israelis. In spite of the fact that Israel was 
careful not to exaggerate the Iranian threat throughout the first decade 
of the Islamic Republic‟s reign, it was aware of the power of Messianic 
fervor within the Iranian leadership‟s ideology. According to Shi‟a 
Messianic tradition, an Armageddon-like battle was to usher the return of 
the Hidden Imam, resulting in the end of days and the salvation of the 
Shi‟a, the true believers. In light of the perceived irrationality of Khomeini‟s 
government, no one was certain to what extent the Iranian ideologues 
were dedicated to fulfilling this Messianic prophecy.  
Direct verbal threats against Israel‟s existence in conjunction with 
the terrifying embrace of martyrdom within the ethos of Islamic resistance 
presented Israel with an explicit, undeniable threat from their former 
Persian ally. One major reason that Israel downplayed this seemingly 
imminent threat was the phenomenal anachronism of the Revolution and 
the irrationality that the Islamic Republic seemed to espouse. The de facto 
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Israeli ambassador to pre-revolutionary Iran, Uri Lubrani, among other 
Israeli officials, was quick to deem the revolutionary government too out 
of touch to last; it was merely a “historical parenthesis”. He opined 
confidently, “The dark utopia of Khomeini and his ilk will not withstand the 
reality test of the late twentieth century. This is a tyrannical, cruel and very 
dogmatic regime. It will not last long”.52 Israelis tried to convince 
themselves that modern secular logic would prevail.  
In his groundbreaking and controversial book Iranophobia, Haggai 
Ram argues that Israeli paranoia of post-revolutionary Iran, which 
remained just under the surface of Israeli discourse throughout Khomeini‟s 
reign and the Iran-Iraq war, was a reflection of internal societal anxieties 
more than a straightforward reaction to the verbal threats emanating 
from Iran. One significant effect of the Iranian revolution on the Israeli 
psyche was the damage it did to Israel‟s sense of stability in its own 
secular nature. Prior to the revolution, Israel had looked to Iran as the 
primary example of a successful Western-allied secular modern nation in 
the Middle East. That image had shattered, leaving Israel deeply 
concerned about the repercussions such a shift might have on its own 
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precarious secular nature, especially now that an Ultra-Orthodox Party 
was to take part in policymaking.53 
Most Mizrahi Jews were politically right-leaning and more socially 
conservative than the largely secular Ashkenazi Jews of European 
descent.54 Claims of marginalization and inequality showed the 
mainstream Ashkenazi populace that decades of attempted assimilation 
had failed. Subsequently, the secular Ashkenazi ruling class feared that 
the Eastern identity and values that the Mizrahim refused to abandon 
would infiltrate and dominate Israeli society, forcing Israel to blend in with 
the surrounding Middle East. Israeli politician Yosef Lapid stated his fear 
bluntly when he said that Israelis are “in a corrupt, lazy, backward 
environment. What keeps us above water is our cultural difference. If our 
Westernism erodes, we don‟t have a chance. If we let the Eastern 
European ghetto and the North African ghetto take over… we will blend 
into the Semitic region and be lost within a terrible Levantine dunghill”.55 
By criticizing Iran, Ram suggests, the secular Israeli populace was 
projecting its fear of the growing Orthodox and right-leaning Mizrahi 
influence within Israel. The deep-seated, almost apocalyptic scenario in 
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these secular Israelis‟ collective imagination posited post-revolutionary 
Iran as a frightening omen of the future of Israel and presented Israelis with 
the unfathomable fear of becoming a “Jewish Iran”. Ram terms this 
paranoia a “moral panic”: a mass hysteria generated by the exploitation 
of people‟s worst fears by government, media or academic sources.56 
Maintaining an external enemy not only serves to quell internal divisions 
(such as social, ethnic, political, religious-secular, or separatist conflicts), 
but was also effective in distracting the world‟s attention from domestic 
conflicts; in the case of Israel, the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and 
the Golan, for which Israel received what it believed to be 
disproportionate and unjust criticism. The mass hysteria aimed at Iran, to 
whatever extent and with whatever underlying implications it may have 
existed in Israeli society, remained relatively subdued throughout Israel‟s 
cooperation with Iran against Iraq.  
As discussed earlier, the Islamic Republic also relied on anti-Israel 
rhetoric for the purpose of quelling internal divisions and nurturing 
cohesion. The latent anti-Semitism within the Iranian Shi‟a narrative laid 
the foundation for broad support for government advocated 
condemnation of Zionism and Israel. 
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         Chapter Three  
            Underlying Connections 
 
Iranian-Israeli Parallels 
Iran and Israel shared many political, ideological, and cultural 
similarities, both pre- and post-Revolution. Prior to the fall of the Shah, 
Israeli and Iranian foreign policies were very much in line with one 
another, evidenced by their Periphery alliance. These two non-Arab 
economic powers relied on Western, specifically American support, were 
united in their opposition to Soviet influence in the region, and shared a 
common animosity toward the Arab governments of the Middle East. Iraq 
was of particular concern. Its megalomaniacal leader, Saddam Hussein, 
represented both Israel and the Shah‟s most immediate threat. The 
dramatic shift in Iran‟s political orientation following the overthrow of the 
Shah superficially posited Iran and Israel on opposing ends of the 
geopolitical and ideological spectrum. In reality, the two enemies shared 
some striking similarities. 
Both Israel and monarchical Iran shared a common quasi-imaginary 
identity. Both of these Western allied nations sought desperately to 
distance themselves from the Arab Orient, which they insolently perceived 
to be uncomfortably close, both geographically and culturally. The 
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Pahlavi regime propagated the theory that Iranians were “Aryan”, 
members of an Indo-European race that had historically populated both 
Iran and Europe. The Aryan theory was well received by the Iranian 
people, and successfully convinced them of their imagined racial affinity 
with the civilized Europeans whom they had venerated for generations. 
Aryanism was a powerful force in Iranian nationalism and successfully 
allowed Iranians to psychologically distance themselves from the 
uncivilized Arabs whom they scorned. Israeli society, traditionally 
dominated by Ashkenazi Jews of European descent, also embraced the 
strategic objective of Westernizing its populace, specifically its Mizrahi and 
Eastern European populations.57 Both Iranian and Israeli governments 
intended to “transform Oriental subjects into deracinated replicas of 
Europeans”.58 Both states implemented colonial ideals of modernization, 
including coercive secularization and Westernization of cultural signifiers 
such as clothing and social mores. Gazing firmly toward the West, both 
Israel and Iran saw themselves and one another as progressive, 
modernizing forces struggling against backwards, fanatically religious 
elements in the surrounding Middle East and more importantly, from within 
their respective societies.  
                                                        
57 Ironically, it took a mass exodus from Europe for a European identity to take hold among 
Ashkenazi Jews, for they were historically stigmatized as foreign elements in Europe. 




In contrast to the ideological polarity between the State of Israel 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran, pragmatic foreign policies emerged from 
the two countries in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War that paralleled one 
another in many respects. Both Iran and Israel believed that their survival 
was at stake59, and therefore had no choice but cooperate to defeat 
Saddam Hussein, who remained both Israel and Iran‟s primary foe. 
Accordingly, both focused their resources and military efforts against Iraq. 
Deemed immoral to many within the Israeli government and the general 
public, the perpetuation of military and food trade in light of such harsh 
rhetoric demonstrated the power of national security and political gain 
over ideological foundations.  
 
  Israel and the Islamic Republic shared a core epistemological 
outlook; in the words of Dr. Haggai Ram, “Messianism and the 
interpretation of the sacred and the profane have been crucial in 
imagining modern Iran and Israel. Both secular Zionists and Islamic Iranians 
moved salvation from the heavens to the plains”.60 Both nations, albeit in 
very different ways, took purely religious ideas and translated them into 
                                                        
59 “Israel exaggerating ‘Existential Threat’ to the Jewish State from Iran” Rupee News. 
www.rupeenews.com September 15, 2009 
 
60 Ram, pg. 17  
58 
 
political realities. Modern political Zionism was a secular movement with a 
theological foundation. This groundbreaking movement took the religious 
notion of Jewish Messianism, the idea that God will send a messiah to 
return the Jews to Zion (Israel) and usher in an era of peace and ultimately 
the salvation of the Jews; and turned it on its head. It transformed the 
millennia-old concept of ritual longing for Zion61 into a political movement 
with the goal of establishing a Jewish nation in the land that was the 
historical place of provenance for the global Diaspora. But the basis of this 
political movement, that Jews are the rightful heirs of the land, is Biblical in 
origin; God promised this land to his Chosen People and sanctioned the 
Hebrews, the descendants of the Jews, to conquer the land in which the 
Canaanites lived and to claim it as their own. Whether viewed historically 
or spiritually, the Jewish Diaspora‟s connection to the physical “holy” land 
of Israel was essential to the survival Jewish customs and rituals, Jewish 
identity, and the Hebrew language. Recited annually for centuries, the 
universal Jewish prayer to observe the Passover “next year in Jerusalem” 
was interpreted as a spiritual, not physical, return to the Holy Land. Prior 
the birth of the European political Zionist movement, only a tiny fraction of 
Diaspora Jews actually migrated to Palestine.  
                                                        




Because only God can prompt the return to Zion and the coming of 
the Messiah, Political Zionism technically “hastened the end”62, in violation 
of Orthodox Jewish tradition (the sole interpretation until the post-
Enlightenment European Reform Judaism movement). According to the 
Midrash, a medieval compilation of Biblical interpretations, until the return 
of the messiah Jews the world over must accept the reign of gentiles. 
Whereas modern religious Zionists believe that the establishment of Israel is 
the inception of salvation, many Ultra-Orthodox consider it a rebellion 
against the divine punishment of exile.63 This Messianic prophecy, whether 
explicitly acknowledged by political Zionists or not, is “in the air and soil of 
Israel”.64 
The theological foundation of the Jewish claim to Israel clashed 
with the secular and Socialist ideals of the Zionist movement. High 
immigration and birth rates among European Orthodox and Mizrahi Jews, 
few of whom were secular, changed the demographics of Israel and 
threatened the Ashkenazi ethnocracy. These religious Israelis embraced 
the theological foundation of Zionism and the State of Israel, and by 
pushing for a more religious Israeli society and political orientation, 
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initiated the transformation of Israel into a more conservative “Middle 
Eastern” society looking more to the past and less towards the future.  
 
While Israel struggled vehemently to maintain its secular nature, the 
Islamic Republic was more confident in embracing a religious foundation 
in forming a national identity. Khomeini‟s interpretation of velayat-e-faqih 
(jurist‟s guardianship) was disguised and presented as a fundamentalist 
movement, whereas in reality the doctrine as proposed by Khomeini was 
radical and innovative within Shi‟a Islam. Velayat-e-faqih had been 
debated by Shi‟a scholars for centuries, and historically referred to the 
clergy‟s apolitical duties, including guardianship over those who required 
it, like the poor and the insane; but these Islamic scholars never condoned 
political rule by the clergy.65 Furthermore, these scholars never explicitly 
condemned secular monarchical rule, whereas Khomeinism stressed 
precisely this point.  In his early speeches and writings, Khomeini claimed 
that monarchy was un-Islamic.66 Numerous clerics opposed Khomeini‟s 
interpretation, claiming that it contradicted Islamic law, but in the end 
Khomeini succeeded in using this apolitical Islamic concept as the 
foundation of the modern Iranian nation.  
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In this way Khomeinism, like modern Zionism, took a religious 
ideology and transformed it into a political reality. Both movements 
“usurped the divine prerogative”67, assigning humans a role in what was 
historically and theologically purely within the realm of the divine. By 
relegating the task of redemption to human beings, both Zionism and 
Khomeinism directly contradicted previous Jewish and Shi‟a 
understandings of Messianism, redemption, and civic governance. As a 
result these theological concepts, fundamental in Israeli and Iranian 
national identity, have come to underlie the political, economical and 
social-cultural spheres of contemporary Iranian and Israeli discourse. The 
two examples differ in that Zionism struggles to maintain a secular nature 
(a fundamental contradiction) while Khomeini‟s interpretation of velayat-
e-faqih unapologetically denounces “Western” secularism and 
unequivocally posits divine law above human (secular) law. 68 
Khomeini‟s Islamist ideology was hostile to the principle of 
Nationalism. Accordingly, Khomeini saw Iran primarily as one (crucial) part 
of the greater Islamic world, and his foreign policy aimed to reflect this 
ideology. But in reality he was ruling a modern nation-state, and he came 
to espouse the Shah‟s goal of establishing Iran as the regional 
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superpower. Israel shared similar aspirations for regional military 
supremacy, and to this end the two nations often set aside ideology in 
favor of a “strategic rivalry for military pre-eminence.”69 The rivalry has only 
intensified with time, largely due to recent evidence of nuclear 
enrichment and the potential for nuclear weapons capability in Iran.  
“Even before manufacturing a single bomb, Iran has become a regional 
superpower influencing international policy”70 while Israel remains the 
region‟s dominant military power.  
Khomeini‟s nationalist tendencies showed that ultimately ideology 
alone cannot guide a nation‟s foreign policy.  Similarly, Israel is an 
intensely proud nation struggling to define itself, while simultaneously 
declaring itself the representative and guardian of all the world‟s Jews.  Its 
role and identity transcend its national boundaries, which are both literally 
and metaphorically ambiguous and unsettled. 
 
Politics of Identity 
The national identities of many countries are shaped by ideas of 
their past greatness, but rarely is a modern nation‟s identity drawn in such 
a calculated manner from a glorified and romanticized past as in the 
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case of Israel and monarchical Iran, and to a lesser extent Islamic Iran. For 
Israel, this historical grandeur is embodied in the short-lived but legendary 
ancient Israeli kingdoms of David and Solomon, as well as the Biblical 
designation of the Jews as God‟s “Chosen People”. Secular, monarchical 
Iran downplayed its Islamic identity while venerating its pre-Islamic past, 
whose most distinguished hero and source of pride, Cyrus the Great, 
founded the first and most expansive Persian Empire, that of the 
Achaemenids. As the liberator of the exiled Jews in Babylon and 
benefactor of the Second Temple, Jewish tradition bestows King Cyrus 
with such high regard that he is honored as the sole gentile messiah in the 
Jewish Bible. This ancient and deeply meaningful Persian-Jewish friendship 
served as the foundation of the imagined “natural alliance” which Israel 
used to justify its relationship with Iran throughout the monarchical and 
into the post-revolutionary period. Many Israelis believed that “Iran and 
Israel need each other. These laws have proven themselves to be true 
from the time of Cyrus to the present time. It has always been this way 
and will always be the same.”71 
The Iranian revolution elicited a major psychological shift in 
government advocated national identity. With the overthrow of the Shah 
and the subsequent rejection of its pre-Islamic roots, Iran returned to an 
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imagined past dominated by fundamental Islamic values. The Islamic 
Republic‟s state-endorsed national identity, like its predecessor‟s, 
delegitimized and at times showed hostility toward crucial components of 
the Iranian people‟s collective identity. Hence, both regimes succeeded 
in alienating significant elements of the populace.  
These starkly contrasting, narrowly interpreted national identities, 
based largely on a particular selected historical narrative, were 
instrumental in defining modern Iran‟s allies and enemies; most notably 
Israel. As a Persian nation emphasizing its pre-Islamic identity, Iran‟s 
relationship with the Jewish people, and thus Israel, was envisioned as 
positive, beneficial, and natural. As a Muslim nation focused on its Islamic 
past, the perceived historical relationship with the Jewish people became 
more ambiguous. Historically, Jewish-Muslim relations were not especially 
hostile. As with Jewish-Zoroastrian historical relations, there existed periods 
of cooperation and periods of conflict.  
The relationship between Iran and Israel was not purely viewed 
through a religious-historical lens. Political orientation was also an essential 
factor. What ultimately distinguished Islamic Iran‟s view of Israel from 
secular Iran‟s view was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a Persian nation, 
Iran perceived the conflict as an Israeli-Arab issue, Arabs being the 
traditional adversaries of Persians. In this context, there was an element of 
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the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” phenomenon, for Jews did not 
hold a special place in the collective Iranian mindset in the same way 
Persians did for Jews. The shift in Iranian identity following the revolution 
greatly altered the perception of Jews and Israelis, for as a self-perceived 
Muslim nation, Iran viewed the conflict as a Jewish-Muslim issue; Muslims 
being the unquestionable allies of Islamic Iran. To this day the Islamic 
Regime narrative includes “protecting oppressed (Muslim) nations, such as 
Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan as part of the Iranian-Islamic identity.”72  
In spite of the fact that Jews and Muslims share many religious 
narratives and tenets in common (and in fact Islam is fundamentally 
based on Judaism), I believe that an underlying hostility toward the 
“Jewish tribe”, who summarily rejected Mohammad and Islam, has long 
existed among the Iranian Shi‟a. A long history of anti-Semitism in Iran 
attests to this hostility. This fundamental religious clash based on 
differences in theological interpretation lies in stark contrast to the older 
relationship between Judaism and Zoroastrianism, two religions that 
greatly influenced one another but were fundamentally unrelated. 
 
                                                        





Subdued at times and exaggerated at others, post-revolutionary 
Iran and Israel maintained a near-infatuation with one another, often 
translated into verbal attacks and threats of violence. The relentless 
confrontational bravado emanating from Iran and more recently Israel 
indicates an undeniable preoccupation with the other, which I propose 
points to a latent sense of respect. Both governments feel threatened by 
one another, suggesting an underlying, largely unconscious admiration. 
This mutual admiration was acknowledged during the monarchy, but was 
vehemently rejected following the revolution, first by Iran, and eventually 
by Israel.  
Latent admiration beneath a confrontational veneer is an example 
of a phenomenon called “reaction formation”, well documented in the 
field of Psychoanalytic theory. This type of behavior, whether manifested 
in an individual, society, or government, is a type of defense mechanism 
in which an emotion that is difficult to manage is manifested as a directly 
opposing emotion, often due to anxiety.73 According to this psychological 
process it is possible for love to manifest unconsciously as hate, or respect 
for resentment. A classic example would be a young girl who has a crush 
on a boy, whom she proceeds to hit, out of frustration. There is a fine line 
between love and hate, as the saying goes. Post-revolutionary Iran‟s 
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relentless preoccupation with Israel, I propose, shows Iran‟s 
acknowledgment of Israel‟s might and power, which in turn suggests that 
Israel was a worthy enough opponent to deserve the time and energy 






















 When the Shah departed Iran, Khomeini inherited the world‟s sixth 
largest army, foreign currency reserves of over $25 billion, an oil industry 
earning over $100 million a day, the thirteenth highest GNP in the world, 
and a legacy of close relations with Israel.74 True to his convictions, the 
provocative elderly cleric promptly ended diplomatic relations with the 
Israel. He now had an impressive platform to advance his campaign to 
inspire millions of Muslims to fight Israel and what he considered the 
malicious presence of Zionism across the world, and to spread Islamic 
revolution across the Muslim World. While no Western allied governments 
were overthrown, as was Khomeini‟s hope, “the Iranian model… was a 
source of inspiration for the rise of Al-Qaeda, for the fortification of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and for the rise of Hamas – all of which were different 
and oftentimes rival movements that share a conception of a 
revolutionized Muslim world”.75 
The Ayatollah proceeded to eliminate as much of the Shah‟s 
establishment as was possible, including a widespread purge of military 
commanders and personnel, and with it the knowledge needed to 
manage Iran‟s military. The pressures of realpolitik compromised the 
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Islamic Republic‟s ideological motives, and Iran found itself almost totally 
dependent upon arms, ammunition and parts from the “Little Satan” 
Israel, without which it would likely have suffered a swift defeat by 
Saddam Hussein‟s formidable military. Israel itself was distraught at the 
thought of losing its closest regional partner, the “crown in the jewel” of its 
Periphery allies and thought it wise to maintain a channel to Iran, for they 
expected Khomeini‟s regime to collapse before long.  
Meanwhile, shifting geopolitical realities were changing the nature 
of Israel‟s foreign policy strategy, which had substantiated an enduring 
alliance between the two nations. Between 1977 and 1980, the Israeli 
government shifted considerably to the right, Egypt made peace with 
Israel, Iran experienced a dramatic reversal in political orientation, and 
Iraq instigated a brutal war with Iran. These developments signaled the 
beginning of a profound shift in Israel‟s perception of Iran as a natural, 
eternal ally. But it was extremely difficult for Israel to let go of Iran and 
there was much disagreement within the Israeli government about how to 
proceed with Khomeini‟s government. Israel generally considered Iran‟s 
inflammatory rhetoric a hollow threat, and assumed the Islamic Republic 
would collapse before long. Accordingly, throughout the 1980‟s it 
refrained from reciprocating the hostile rhetoric emanating from Khomeini 
and his extremist government.  
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These threats, which continue to echo from the Islamic Republic to 
this day, however hollow or serious they may actually be, must be 
considered in light of the national traumas of the Jews of Israel. At best 
marginalized and at worst collectively annihilated, the Jewish narrative is 
a proud but grim one. The pogroms of Eastern Europe and the Holocaust, 
as well as less severe examples of anti-Jewish hostility in Europe and the 
Middle East elicited a collective paranoia and victim complex remnant in 
the modern state of Israel, which has been translated in part to what 
Haggai Ram terms “Iranophobia.” This public sense of vulnerability is 
exploited by the Israeli government and serves as “calculated distraction 
from what it does not want the United States and does not want the world 
to pay attention to”76; namely the continued settlement building and 
occupation of the West Bank and the Golan Heights, and the siege of the 
Gaza Strip. 
Likewise, the Iranian backlash against Western hegemony and 
values, often forced down the throats of unwilling communities, should be 
understood within the context of Decolonization in the mid-20th century. 
Although never an outright colony of a European power, Iranians had 
developed a deep resentment of British and American (and to a much 
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lesser extent Israeli) interference in Iranian politics, economics and society. 
The Anglo-American powers facilitated and supported corrupt 
authoritarian Iranian kings for the bulk of the 20th century. Arguably the 
pivotal moment in the formation of this resentment came in 1953 with the 
British-American led coup of Iran‟s democratically elected Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mossadegh. His move to nationalize the British-controlled 
Iranian oil industry did not suit the interests of the avaricious British leaders, 
who exploited the Eisenhower administration‟s Cold War Communism-
phobia and convinced the U.S. to partake in their coup. The blatant 
disregard for the democratic aspirations and self-determination of the 
Iranian populace in favor of the obedient Shah was not forgotten by the 
Iranian masses and a deep distrust of the United States formed in their 
collective mindset. Khomeini believed that the “Imperialists” and their 
agents “want us to remain afflicted and wretched, and our poor to be 
trapped in their misery ... they and their agents (including Jews and other 
supporters of the Shah) wish to go on living in huge palaces and enjoying 
lives of abominable luxury.”77 This distrust and resentment was instrumental 
in the attack on the American Embassy, called the “den of spies” 
because it was the base of the 1953 coup operations.  
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The resentment of foreign interference translated to a great extent 
into anti-Israeli sentiment, for Israel, and Jews, served as a convenient 
scapegoat. Certainly Israel was guilty of supporting the hated Shah and 
helping to train SAVAK78, but it had committed much less offense against 
Iran than the U.S. or Britain. Israel was disproportionately targeted 
because it was both politically and spiritually offensive. In addition to its 
support of the Shah, Israel‟s nationhood posed a grave threat to Islam in 
the mind of Khomeini and many of his religious following. Anti-Zionist 
sentiment was already established among religious elements of the 
society at the time of the revolution. In addition, some leftists and other 
secular elements were also very critical of Israel, so gathering popular 
support for the government‟s anti-Israel policy was not difficult. 
Furthermore, the Ayatollah was aware of the folly of alienating the 
Western superpowers, whereas he deemed Israel a more valuable enemy 
than ally. The impasse with the United States was not intentional, and ties 
with Britain have continued uninterrupted to this day.  
 
 In the greater context of the tumultuous Middle East of the 1980‟s, 
Iran and Israel came to be seen as ideological and political polar 
                                                        





opposites. The animosity between the two former allies was presented as 
a clash of civilizations: a secular, Western democracy against a 
backwards, theological authoritarian regime. Yet in reality there were 
striking similarities in geopolitical strategy, national and religious ideology, 
and domestic social psychology. Studying the history of Iranian-Israeli 
relations, specifically focusing on the effects of the Iranian Revolution and 
the Islamic Republic‟s rhetoric, reveals a complex and misunderstood 
relationship, colored by a deep historical-emotional bond and a 
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